Signal-Jamming in a Sequential Auction
Copyright policy )Signal-Jamming in a Sequential Auction
In a recurring auction early bids may reveal bidders’ types, which in turn affects bidding in later auctions. Bidders take this into account and may bid in a way that conceals their private information until the last auction is played. The present paper analyzes the equilibrium of a sequence of ?rst-price auctions assuming bidders have stable private values. We show that signal-jamming occurs and explore the dynamics of equilibrium prices.
Dynamisches Gleichgewicht, Auctions, Preiswettbewerb, 330, ddc:330, Signalling, price competition, Signaling and communication in game theory, Signaling, Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models, Auctions; Signaling; Price Competition, Extensives Spiel, Auktionstheorie, auctions, Auctions, Signaling, Price Competition, signaling, Price Competition, Theorie
Dynamisches Gleichgewicht, Auctions, Preiswettbewerb, 330, ddc:330, Signalling, price competition, Signaling and communication in game theory, Signaling, Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models, Auctions; Signaling; Price Competition, Extensives Spiel, Auktionstheorie, auctions, Auctions, Signaling, Price Competition, signaling, Price Competition, Theorie
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