Historically, the Supreme Court has offered two justifications for the Exclusionary Rule: one, it protects the integrity of the judicial system, and two, it deters illegal searches by the police. The former justification has mostly fallen out of favor; for the past four decades decisions have turned on whether or not applying the Rule in various situations would, in fact, deter. As such, most empirical studies about the Rule have focused on whether or not in practice aggressive use of it does or does not lead to fewer police searches (illegal or otherwise), or to fewer convictions. In this study, I take a different approach, assessing support for the two competing justifications for the Rule. In two experiments, I show that people endorse the integrity justification, and fail to find much support at all for the deterrence justification. This finding is important given that the Rule is not a constitutionally-mandated remedy for illegal searches. As such, it can be ignored to the extent that (a) it does not achieve its goals and (b) undermines the perceived legitimacy of the courts by the public. If this is so, then the Court needs to be right about what those goals are, and whether or not its current jurisprudence toward the Rule does in fact enhance legitimacy. I conclude by arguing that reinvigorating the integrity justification would serve the ends of the Rule better than current doctrine does.