
doi: 10.21236/ada561663
Abstract : Current and potential adversaries of the United States and its allies have made use of the internet to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow competing groups, regimes, and governments in their own unconventional warfare strategies. Although the national and defense strategies now emphasize operations in Cyberspace, most of the focus is defensive, rather than offensive. The United States Special Operations Forces (SOF) are inadequately postured to conduct Unconventional Warfare (UW) in and through the Cyberspace Domain as part of the full range of Special Operations. This paper specifically focuses on the capabilities required for SOF to conduct Unconventional Warfare in and through the Cyberspace Domain in support of Combatant Commands. It will address the current conceptual and doctrinal documents, as well as policies and authorities for UW in Cyberspace; describe SOF in Cyberspace in the context of the seven phases of UW, and finally address the unclassified capability shortfalls and potential solutions utilizing the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Facilities, and Policy (DOTMLPF-P) framework.
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