Abstract: Locke proposes a Hobbesian definition of a free action as one such that if the agent wills to do it, then she can do it; and if she wills to "forbear" it, then she can forbear it. This has led to classifying him as a compatibilist. The author argues that he's an incompatibilist and a libertarian. Although Locke frequently refers to "what determines the will," these references are to an agent's reasons for having specific volitions, not to their causes. Locke's elaborate theory of human motivation and agency reveals that he doesn't hold that volitions are causally necessitated. There's also a neglected passage in the Essay and another in his correspondence where he denies that they are, and says that if they were, this would entail that we aren't free. The author explains why Locke didn't build the requirement that free actions can't be causally necessitated into his definition of freedom, and how he would respond to the objection that such nondetermined actions would be random events.