I should admit from the start that I am deeply sympathetic to Shusterman's perspective. I, like Shusterman, consider myself a pragmatist commit ted to a critique of analytic aesthetics from a revived Deweyan per spective. I, too, favor Hegelian themes of holism, historicism, and organicism, but without Hegel's absolutism. I am also sympathetic to what Shusterman calls Dewey's somatic naturalism. Moreover, I agree that although there are no ahistorical positive essences, there are rela tive, historicized essences. Thus, most of what I will say is a matter of encouraging Shusterman to be consistent with his own pragmatist nature, and to give up certain remaining bonds to analytic aesthetics. I will leave discussion of Shusterman's theories of popular music to others. Following the tradition of analytic anti-essentialism, Shusterman cri tiques "the wrapper model" of the definition of art (Leddy 1998, 125-28), which holds that a good definition will give us necessary and sufficient conditions for "work of art." Shusterman raises good objec tions to Dickie's institutional definition of art and to Carroll's art-iden