
arXiv: 0810.5698
In this paper we study the nonzero-sum Dynkin game in continuous time which is a two player non-cooperative game on stopping times. We show that it has a Nash equilibrium point for general stochastic processes. As an application, we consider the problem of pricing American game contingent claims by the utility maximization approach.
16 pages
Probability (math.PR), 91A15, 91A15; 91A10; 91A30; 60G40; 91A60, FOS: Economics and business, 91A60, 91A30, 91A10, FOS: Mathematics, Pricing of Securities (q-fin.PR), Quantitative Finance - Pricing of Securities, Mathematics - Probability, 60G40
Probability (math.PR), 91A15, 91A15; 91A10; 91A30; 60G40; 91A60, FOS: Economics and business, 91A60, 91A30, 91A10, FOS: Mathematics, Pricing of Securities (q-fin.PR), Quantitative Finance - Pricing of Securities, Mathematics - Probability, 60G40
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