AbstractProponents as well as opponents of modeling aesthetic interpretation on conversation tend to assume that this implies that the author's intention constitutes the meaning of her work and that the aim of interpretation consists in recovering it. These assumptions, however, seem to be supported only by a rather constricted conception of conversational interpretation. In this article, I present a model of conversational interpretive interaction that accommodates anti‐intentionalism as well as intentionalism qua aims of interpretation, while doing without the notion of work meaning. I also set out to account for the distinctive varieties of intentionalism and anti‐intentionalism that are implied by the model. The ensuing restrictions of evidence are such that intentionalism and anti‐intentionalism should be practiced as, what I label, ultra extreme actual intentionalism and reasonable author hypothetical intentionalism, respectively. The article aims to contribute to the exploration of the potential of conversation for unifying and regimenting aesthetic interpretation.