ABSTRACTThis paper undertakes the test of deflating the notion of entitlement in Robert Brandom's main approach to explain human discursive agency: the deontic scorekeeping model. The core claim is that entitlement can be either irrelevant, subsidiary, or less relevant than the other major notion of Brandom's model: commitment. The underlying goal of the article is to test the extent to which entitlement can be more or less dispensable in the overall project of normative pragmatics. To carry out this exploration, I propose three versions of the entitlement deflation argument: a strong one, which regards commitment without entitlement; a standard one, which views entitlement as subordinate to commitment; and a weak one, which considers both concepts in their reciprocal determination with the priority of commitment in one particular aspect. The result of the test will allow a better understanding of Brandom's deontic scorekeeping model from the inside through the interaction between its two main conceptual tools, while opening the possibility of a simplification of the model in its theoretical components to make it more robust. Finally, the analysis will reveal the moral foundations implicit in Brandom's model.