Quine’s “Epistemology Naturalized” has become part of the canon in epistemology and excited a widespread revival of interest in naturalism. Yet the status accorded the essay is ironic, since both friends and foes of philosophical naturalism deny that Quine makes a plausible case that the methods of naturalism can accommodate the problems of epistemology. Diagnoses of the problems vary. Critics insist that a Quinean naturalism either cannot provide norms and so cannot be epistemology (Kim 1988), or cannot legitimate is own basic presuppositions and procedures and so is essentially incomplete as an epistemology (Putnam 1982 and van Fraassen 1995), or is just armchair speculation and so not interestingly different from epistemological projects Quine rejects (Foley 1994). Self-described friends of naturalism (Goldman 1986, Haack 1993b) are equally uneasy, for they too doubt that Quine can successfully incorporate the substance of epistemology within the limits of his naturalism. Is naturalized epistemology epistemology enough? Skepticism here is, I maintain, symptomatic of a pervasive misreading of the main line of argument of “Epistemology Naturalized.” Consequently, its moral regarding naturalism remains misunderstood. This misunderstanding, in turn, encourages complaints alleging confusion or vagueness regarding what naturalism is and its sufficiency for the tasks of epistemology.