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A Theory of Political Entrenchment

descriptionPublicationkeyboard_double_arrow_right Article , Book , Research , Preprint , Report 01 Jan 2012 Italy, France, France, France, France, France Publisher:Oxford University Press (OUP)Journal:The Economic Journal, volume 126, pages 1,238-1,263 (issn: 0013-0133, eissn: 1468-0297,

Authors: Gilles Saint-Paul; TICCHI, DAVIDE; VINDIGNI, ANDREA;

doi: 10.1111/ecoj.12215 , 10.2139/ssrn.2039659

handle: 10419/58819 , 11567/912432

A Theory of Political Entrenchment

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Abstract

Can an incumbent political party increase its chances at re-election by implementing inefficient policies that harm its constituency? This paper studies the possibility of such a phenomenon, which we label political entrenchment. We use a two-party dynamic model of redistribution with probabilistic voting. Political entrenchment by the Left occurs only if incumbency rents are sufficiently high. Low-skill citizens may vote for this party even though they rationally expect the adoption of these policies. We discuss: the possibility of entrenchment by the Right; the scope for commitment to avoid entrenchment policies; and the effect of state capacity, income inequality and party popularity on the likelihood of entrenchment. We illustrate our theory with a number of historical examples.

Countries

Italy, France, France, France, France, France

Related Organizations

French National Centre for Scientific Research
France
Abu Dhabi University
United Arab Emirates
University of Turin
Italy
School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences
France
College of New Jersey
United States

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Keywords

inequality, Wahlkreis, 330, constituencies, political entrenchment, state fiscal capacity, D72, Political entrenchment; constituencies; inequality; inefficient redistribution; checks and balances; political rents; state fiscal capacity., inefficient redistribution, Public Choice, Parteipolitik, CaO-SiO2 system, Melting High-pressure, First principles, [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE, political entrenchment, constituencies, inequality, inefficient redistribution, checks and balances, political rents, state fiscal capacity, Dynamisches Modell, HB Economic Theory, Soziale Ungleichheit, ddc:330, P16, checks and balances, Einkommensumverteilung, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, 321, Political entrenchment; constituencies; inequality; inefficient redistribu- tion; checks and balances; political rents; state fiscal capacity, JC Political theory, political rents, Political Entrenchment, checks and balances; constituencies; inefficient redistribution; inequality; political entrenchment; political rents; state fiscal capacity, Theorie, jel: jel:D72, jel: jel:P16

Impact byBIP!

	citations This is an alternative to the "Influence" indicator, which also reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically).	15
	popularity This indicator reflects the "current" impact/attention (the "hype") of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network.	Average
	influence This indicator reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically).	Average
	impulse This indicator reflects the initial momentum of an article directly after its publication, based on the underlying citation network.	Average