According to an emerging international consensus, the practice of human genetics should respect both human dignity and human rights.' In the Preamble to the Council of Europe's Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine,2 for example, the signatories resolve 'to take such measures as are necessary to safeguard human dignity and the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual with regard to the application of biology and medicine'; and, similarly, in the Preamble to UNESCO's recently adopted Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights3 an instrument peppered with references to human dignity and human rights it is emphasised that research on the human genome 'should fully respect human dignity, freedom and human rights'. Yet, how should we interpret this commitment, particularly the commitment to respect for human dignity? Even if we do not dismiss '[a]ppeals to human dignity ... [as] comprehensively vague',4 we can scarcely deny that they need some unpacking. As Mohammed Bedjaoui has remarked: