In each country today, cellular networks operate on carefully separated frequency bands. This careful separation is imposed by the regulators of the given country to avoid the interference between these networks. But, the separation is only valid for the network operators within the borders of their country, hence the operators are left on their own to resolve cross-border interference of their cellular networks. In this paper, we focus on the scenario of two operators, who want to fine-tune the emitting power of the pilot signals (i.e., beacon signals) of their base stations. This operation is crucial, because the pilot signal power determines the number of users they can attract and hence the revenue they can obtain. We show that operators should be strategic in their borders, meaning to fine-tune the emitting power of their pilot signals. In addition, we study Nash equilibrium conditions in an empirical model and show the efficiency of the Nash equilibria for different user densities. Finally, we modify our game model and relate the modified pilot power control game to a well-known Prisoner's Dilemma.