
Applying evolutionary game theory and method which aim at the supply side group enterprises and the demand side group enterprises in food supply and demand network (FSDN), we build the evolutionary game model of FSDN node enterprises implementing traceability system cooperatively. We also study the cooperation mechanism between the node enterprises of bounded rationality. Results show that the probability of cooperation between the two sides group enterprises was negatively correlated with the total cost of cooperation and excess returns obtained from the unilateral implementation. It was also positively correlated with excess total earning of cooperation. By measuring the optimal excess earning ratio and promoting the cooperation probability, it will benefit the development of construction and implementation of the food supply and demand network traceability system.
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