AbstractThe sharing of the Northeast Atlantic mackerel (Scomber scombrus) stock is analysed as a game between four parties: the European Union, Norway, the Faroe Islands, and Iceland. Consideration is given to how the outcome depends on the nature of the stock's migrations. Two types of migrations are considered: (i) density-dependent, where the mackerel migrates into the Icelandic economic zone only if it exceeds 3.5 million t, and (ii) stochastic migrations, where the said migrations are stochastic. It is determined that the Faroe Islands would never accept a cooperative solution wherein they can only fish with the globally optimal fishing mortality within their own zone. This is also true for Iceland when the migrations into her zone are stochastic, but not if they are density-dependent. In the latter case, the other players have incentives to retaliate to Icelandic overfishing by fishing harder, which greatly reduces the number of years when mackerel are available in the Icelandic zone. It is assumed that the objective is maximization of the catch volume over a time-horizon of 50 years.