I argue in this article that there is a mistake in Searle's Chinese room argument that has not received sufficient attention. The mistake stems from Searle's use of the Church-Turing thesis. Searle assumes that the Church-Turing thesis licences the assumption that the Chinese room can run any program. I argue that it does not, and that this assumption is false. A number of possible objections are considered and rejected. My conclusion is that it is consistent with Searle's argument to hold onto the claim that understanding consists in the running of a program.1Searle's Argument1.1The Church-Turing thesis2Criticism of Searle's Argument3Objections and Replies3.1The virtual brain machine objection3.2The brain-based objection3.3The syntax/physics objection3.4The abstraction objection3.5The ‘same conclusion’ objection3.6The ‘unnecessary baggage’ objection3.7The Chinese gym objection3.8The syntax/semantics objection3.9Turing's definition of algorithm3.9.1Consequences3.9.2Criticism of the defence4Conclusion