In my paper (Paseau 2008), I noted that Fitch's argument, which purports to show that if all truths are knowable then all truths are known, can be blocked by typing knowledge. If there is not one knowledge predicate, 6K' but infinitely many, 'Kx' 6K2' . . . , then the type rules prevent application of the predicate 'K/ to (names of) sentences containing %' such as cp A -jyp"1'. This provides a motivated response to Fitch's argument so long as knowledge typing is itself motivated. It was the burden of my paper to explore the case that knowledge typing is as motivated as truth typing by drawing on the parallels between epistemic paradoxes generated by sentences of the kind 'this sentence is unknown' and semantic paradoxes generated by sentences such as 'this sentence is untrue'. Given that typing truth is one of the acknowledged options for solving semantic paradoxes, if the parity argument succeeds it follows that epistemic typing is as well-motivated as truth