In discussing the issue of collective rights for aboriginal peoples, national minorities, and other subcultures within modern nation-states, many writers have set as their task the problem of reconciling these rights with a proper respect for individual autonomy. Will Kymlicka, for example, describes his own work on the subject as an effort to develop “a distinctively liberal approach to multicultural rights.” Such an approach purports to establish that the recognition of collective rights is not only compatible with, but also required by, the liberal commitment to individual autonomy. I know of no account of collective rights that plausibly meets this strong requirement. The purpose of this article is to present and defend such an account. I shall assume that individual autonomy is a valid and important ideal. I shall assume further that individual autonomy requires that persons be relatively free from coercion and manipulation, that they have access to an adequate range of options, and that the state has a role to play in ensuring that they have access to an adequate range of options. Taking these points for granted, the account of collective rights I shall defend consists of two main claims, each of which requires considerable discussion and clarification. The first claim is that, in some