role in the presentation and interpretation of findings. For example, the question has arisen as to how we should view sex differences in earnings which are attributable to occupational differences: as manifestations of discrimination or of the voluntary occupational choices of men and women. Economists who used to assume virtually automatically that only workers' tastes were involved have come at least to acknowledge discrimination as a possible partial explanation. Feminists may make major breakthroughs in scholarly work by suggesting such new interpretations. These examples suggest that values have a legitimate, indeed an unavoidable, role to play in scholarly work. It is foolish to deny this. How often have we found ourselves calling those we disagree with biased while praising those who share our views for their objectivity! Yet to say it is virtually impossible for social science research to be value free is not to abandon the quest for truth in scholarship-only to understand better the environment in which it takes place. In my opinion, as scholars we can all aid this quest by making our values clear to our readers. Few are neutral-it is not a question of feminist versus "objective" scholarship. It is also helpful if, in presenting our research, we lay bare the data and the reasoning we used to reach our conclusions so that others can question and reinterpret our results. The important and unavoidable role played by values in social science research means that there must be a constant struggle within each of us and within each field of inquiry to benefit from the insights our values give us in selecting interesting questions, making day-to-day research decisions, and interpreting our findings-without letting our values become prisms that distort or bend the truth or blinders that shield us from the truth entirely. This is an ongoing tension which cannot be settled once and for all by the clarification of a few basic concepts. And yet it is a struggle that it is in our interests as feminists to wage. I, for one, believe that, if the cause is just, the truth cannot hurt it.