curred over the past 120 years. These forests, known locally as guzara forests, can be characterized as "regulated commons." The regulation, by placing quantitative restrictions on felling, aimed at an orderly exploitation of these forests. On the surface, the failure of regulation seems to be a simple case of enforcement failure. However, a closer look reveals a fairly complex picture in which factors such as the delineation of property rights and the rent-seeking behavior of those subject to regulation as well as of the regulators themselves have contributed to the problems of these forests. The evidence presented in this article shows that the way the regulation was devised gave rise to a discordant structure of property rights involving the government and the local inhabitants. Despite early signals that it could not be effectively enforced, no rectifying change was introduced in the structure of rights, which has persisted into the postcolonial era. Indeed, there was a reversal of some potentially beneficial institutional changes that had been introduced toward the end of the colonial period. While the process of degradation was set in motion by discordances that arose in the process of delineating property rights, it is the theory of rentseeking behavior that provides an adequate explanation of its persistence as well as of the subsequent reversals. An effective response to the problem of the guzara forests must take account of two additional features in the regulation of these forests. First, in addition to the common property externality that leads to "the tragedy of the commons," these forests also display interjurisdictional externality by virtue of their location. Second, a common