The problem I want to discuss arises from a certain view of the relation between intentions and actions. In forming prior intentions for future actions we aim at providing guidance for those actions. We could also say that in considering what we should do at some future time (or times) and arriving at a decision, we are exercising authority over our future selves. This is more than a metaphor, as I will argue: the guidance we give to our future actions is the same as the guidance provided for us by authoritative pronouncements from someone else (or by the authority of customary norms). Guidance provided by authority, however, may be of two kinds: epistemic or coordinative. We are guided by epistemic authority if we act on its pronouncements in the belief that in doing so we are acting on the balance of reasons as they already apply to us independently of the fact of those pronouncements. Or, rather, as they apply at least approximately. We have reason to believe that by deliberating on the relevant reasons directly and acting on our conclusions, we will not do better. We are guided by coordinating authority if the reasons which antecedently apply to us do not suffice