In The Rejection of Consequentialism, Samuel Scheffler offers the following statement as a rough characterization of (act) consequentialist morality: "Such theories first specify some principle for ranking overall states of affairs from best to worse from an impersonal point of view ... then require ... each agent in all cases to produce the best available outcome overall."' He then goes on to introduce something that he calls "an agent-centred prerogative," using terms very much like these: an agent-centered prerogative would have the function of denying that one is always required to bring about the best available outcome, though at the same time it would always permit one to do so.2 He thinks further departures from consequentialism would require the adoption of agent-centered restrictions, which we might define as follows: an agent-centered restriction would have the function of denying that one is always permitted to bring about the best available outcome; on at least some occasions it would actually forbid one to do so.3 Now Scheffler believes that both departures from consequen-