I have five remarks to make in response to Kohlberg's reply to my paper "Virtue, Sex, and Gender" (this issue). 1. Kohlberg concedes that "in 1980.. . rumination over data of our own led us to take more seriously Carol Gilligan's ideas.... my personal feeling about the validity of Gilligan's ideas has been one of the discovery of an insight." Since my own suggestion was that Kohlberg should start taking Gilligan's research on women's moral conceptions seriously, this is welcome. Kohlberg, like me, now claims to think that Gilligan's challenge to the comprehensiveness of his conception of morality is apt. 2. Kohlberg complains about my use of the biblical stories of Abraham and Solomon on grounds that he would not score Abraham at the highest stage and on grounds that normal fathers would behave just as the mother in Solomon's tale does. Here Kohlberg misses my point. I use the biblical stories first to make a general point to the effect that our culture tends to promote and respect different styles of moral reasoning and attention to different moral problem areas for men and women, and second to claim that there are "family resemblances" between the sexually differentiated biblical conceptions of morality and those which our culture prescribes. Because this is true and because Kohlberg's theory is based on evidence drawn from an all-male sample, all his extravagant claims about the generality and universality of his scheme of moral development strike me as methodologically unwarranted from the start. 3. Kohlberg seems to think that my own moral position is "contextual relativism" and that it is this substantive position which lies at the basis of my disagreement with him. This deserves two comments. First, whereas I do think that Kohlberg espouses a restrictive conception of morality, and although I am very sympathetic with Gilligan's research, which points this up, it is Murphy and Perry and Gilligan, not I, who defend a specific position called "contextual relativism." Second, I argue in my criticism of Murphy's and Gilligan's defense of "contextual relativism" that it does not seem to me to be a moral position at all. "Contextual relativism," as far as I can tell, picks out cognitive skills, not moral ones. Overall I find talk of both "formalism" and "contextual relativism" much less helpful in terms of conveying information about an individual's