DU TJRING the last two years there has been a sharp increase of interest by ethicists in problems of strategy, especially concerning nuclear armaments. This interest has benefited from increasing public attention to theory by the military analysts and also from a vastly greater awareness of problems of strategy by the politically alert public. The work of the ethicists has revived discussion of traditional doctrines, particularly just war theory, and at the same time has broken new ground in the method of analyzing issues in politics. At least one important point, however, is repeatedly slighted in these studies: that is, precisely what concepts of strategy, of morality, and of their relationship are being presupposed by the ethicist? Most of the ethicists' attention has been directed toward specific problems-deterrence policy, for example-while the conceptual framework often has been either weak or merely implicit. Seldom have the ethicists made a clear statement of what kind of insight ethics is supposed to add to the analysis of the professional strategist; nor is it clear how strategy can aid the ethicist in his understanding of his field. Strategists sometimes must be amazed at some of the advice they receive under the label of "moral" and must be tempted to ignore ideas from that field; and the ethicists are similarly dismayed at various moral assumptions made by the strategists and may be tempted unjustifiably to think that the field breeds amoral cynics. It is highly desirable, therefore, to clarify the relation between the two fields. Two extreme possibilities exist in the relationship between strategy and morality. One is that their conclusions must coincide, that the ethicist has nothing to add to what strategists already know. The other extreme is that an inherent contradiction exists between the two pursuits, that there is something ineradicably immoral about strategy as such. Both these positions, incidentally, would render utterly useless any ethical analysis of strategy. The truth, one suspects, lies somewhere in between. The relation which is proposed below is not the only conceivable one, but it illustrates a procedure for finding an answer and seeks to state conclusions which will allow for mutual enrichment by thinkers in the two fields.