The publication in this issue of PNAS of the article by Wein and Liu (1) titled “Analyzing a bioterror attack on the food supply: the case of botulinum toxin in milk,” raises important issues concerning the type of information that should be presented in the open scientific literature. Through the work of the National Academies on homeland security issues, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) has been at the forefront of the critical effort to find the appropriate balance between openness and secrecy since 9/11 (for example, see refs. 2–6). Of particular relevance to this case is the National Academies' report Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism (the “Fink report”; ref. 3). This report, prepared by a committee of security experts and scientists, carefully considered the balance between openness and secrecy with regard to minimizing both bioterrorism and naturally occurring infectious diseases. The report recommended a specific system of self-governance by scientists that is now being established in the United States. But the committee also recognized the need for government advice, guidance, and leadership for the scientific community's system of review and oversight. For this purpose, the committee proposed the creation of a high-level National Science Advisory Board, whose tasks should include providing “case-specific advice on the oversight of research and the communication and dissemination of life sciences information that is relevant for national security and biodefense purposes” (3). The Fink report was released in October 2003, and the establishment of the recommended high-level board, the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), was announced in March 2004 by the then-Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Tommy Thompson. The NSABB's first meeting is scheduled to take place on June 30, 2005, but it will take considerably more time for the board to …