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Management Control and Innovative Activity

descriptionPublicationkeyboard_double_arrow_right Article , Research , Preprint 01 Feb 2004 Germany English Publisher:Springer Science and Business Media LLCJournal:Review of Industrial Organization, volume 24, pages 1-24 (issn: 0889-938X, eissn: 1573-7160,

Authors: Czarnitzki, Dirk; Kraft, Kornelius;

doi: 10.1023/b:reio.0000031361.27597.7c

handle: 10419/24416

Management Control and Innovative Activity

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Abstract

This paper discusses theoretically the different incentives of managers versus firm owners to invest in innovative activities. There are opposing effects concerning R&D intensity in the manager-controlled firm. Our study on the determinants of R&D intensity presents empirical results concerning this question. A sample of German firms with 3,978 observations is used and it turns out that the owner-led firms invest less into R&D than the managerial firms. With respect to the managerled firms, expenditures on R&D depend on the control exerted. If capital shares are widely dispersed and managers are thus only controlled a little by owners, they invest more into R&D. Owner-led firms and managers who are strongly controlled have a very similar R&D intensity.

Country

Germany

Related Organizations

Leibniz Association
Germany
TU Dortmund University
Germany
University of Mannheim
Germany
Centre For European Economic Research
Germany

Keywords

O31, O32, Tobit Regression, 330, ddc:330, Eigentümerstruktur, Investition, Industrielle Forschung, Innovative Activity, Corporate Governance, Incentives, C24, Innovative Activity,Managerial versus Owner-led Firms,Incentives,Tobit Regression, Innovation, Deutschland, Managerial versus Owner-led Firms, D21, Schätzung, jel: jel:C24, jel: jel:D21, jel: jel:O31, jel: jel:O32

Impact byBIP!

	citations This is an alternative to the "Influence" indicator, which also reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically).	45
	popularity This indicator reflects the "current" impact/attention (the "hype") of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network.	Top 10%
	influence This indicator reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically).	Top 10%
	impulse This indicator reflects the initial momentum of an article directly after its publication, based on the underlying citation network.	Top 10%