AbstractThis paper concerns would-be necessary connections between doxastic attitudes about the epistemic statuses of your doxastic attitudes, or ‘higher-order epistemic attitudes’, and the epistemic statuses of those doxastic attitudes. I will argue that, in some situations, it can be reasonable for a person to believepand to suspend judgment about whether believingpis reasonable for her. This will set the stage for an account of the virtue of intellectual humility, on which humility is a matter of your higher-order epistemic attitudes. Recent discussions in the epistemology of disagreement have assumed that the question of the proper response to disagreement aboutpconcerns whether you ought to change your doxastic attitude towardsp. My conclusion here suggests an alternative approach, on which the question of the proper response to disagreement aboutpconcerns the proper doxastic attitude to adopt concerning the epistemic status of your doxastic attitude towardsp.