In methodological debates in linguistics, the scientificness of linguistics is often felt to be unsatisfactory in comparison to the standards of the natural sciences. This inferiority complex is in most cases articulated as the requirement to turn linguistics into a mature empirical theory with the help of, for example, the elaboration and conduct of psycholinguistic experiments. This paper argues that the proposals which have been put forward to fulfil this requirement are based not on workable and generally applied norms of the natural sciences but on outmoded and untenable tenets of the standard view of the analytical philosophy of science. Therefore, a two-step strategy is suggested: metascientific reflection on the nature and limits of experiments as data sources in linguistics has to be based on the continuous comprehension and adjustment of the reflection on the research activities of linguists while working with experiments on the one hand, and insights gained by philosophers of science studying experiments in the natural sciences on the other. The feasibility of this strategy is supported by a case study on psycholinguistic experiments in metaphor research.