
arXiv: 1405.1481
We study the class of potential games that are also graphical games with respect to a given graph $G$ of connections between the players. We show that, up to strategic equivalence, this class of games can be identified with the set of Markov random fields on $G$. From this characterization, and from the Hammersley-Clifford theorem, it follows that the potentials of such games can be decomposed to local potentials. We use this decomposition to strongly bound the number of strategy changes of a single player along a better response path. This result extends to generalized graphical potential games, which are played on infinite graphs.
Accepted to the Journal of Economic Theory
FOS: Computer and information sciences, 330, potential games, Probability (math.PR), 004, Noncooperative games, FOS: Economics and business, Potential games, graphical games, Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory, Economics - Theoretical Economics, FOS: Mathematics, Theoretical Economics (econ.TH), Graphical games, Random fields, Games involving graphs, Mathematics - Probability, Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT)
FOS: Computer and information sciences, 330, potential games, Probability (math.PR), 004, Noncooperative games, FOS: Economics and business, Potential games, graphical games, Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory, Economics - Theoretical Economics, FOS: Mathematics, Theoretical Economics (econ.TH), Graphical games, Random fields, Games involving graphs, Mathematics - Probability, Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT)
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