Sincere voting in an electorate with heterogeneous preferences

descriptionPublicationkeyboard_double_arrow_right Article 01 May 2017 English Publisher:Elsevier BVJournal:Economics Letters, volume 154, pages 120-123 (issn: 0165-1765,

Copyright policy )

Authors: Ginzburg, Boris;

doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.02.033

handle: 10016/25171

Sincere voting in an electorate with heterogeneous preferences

- Summary
- Subjects
- Metrics

Abstract

Much of the theoretical literature on voting with private information finds that voters do not vote sincerely at the equilibrium. Yet there is little empirical support for this result. This paper shows that when the electorate is sufficiently divided, sincere voting is an equilibrium strategy for an arbitrarily large proportion of voters. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Related Organizations

Carlos III University of Madrid
Spain

Keywords

fractionalisation, Information aggregation, conflicting preferences, Individual preferences, Fractionalisation, information, Economía, C72, D82, D72, voting, Information, Voting theory, Voting, Conflicting preferences, Condorcet jury theorem

Impact byBIP!

	selected citations These citations are derived from selected sources. This is an alternative to the "Influence" indicator, which also reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically).	4
	popularity This indicator reflects the "current" impact/attention (the "hype") of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network.	Average
	influence This indicator reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically).	Average
	impulse This indicator reflects the initial momentum of an article directly after its publication, based on the underlying citation network.	Average