On the attainment of the maximum sustainable yield in the Verhulst–Lotka–Volterra model
Copyright policy )On the attainment of the maximum sustainable yield in the Verhulst–Lotka–Volterra model
We reformulate the Verhulst-Lotka-Volterra model of natural resource extraction under the alternative assumptions of Cournot behaviour and perfect competition, to revisit the tragedy of commons vs the possibility of sustainable harvesting. We stress the different impact of demand elasticity on the regulator’s possibility of driving industry harvest to the maximum sustainable yield in the two settings. The presence of a flat demand function offers the authority a fully effective regulatory tool in the form of the exogeneous price faced by perfectly competitive firms, to drive their collective harvest rate at the maximum sustainable yield. The same cannot happen under Cournot competition, as in this case the price is endogenous and the regulator’s policy is confined to limiting access to the common pool.
- Alma Mater Studiorum University of Bologna Italy
- University of California, Berkeley United States
L13, open-loop controls, Q20, Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.), ddc:330, differential games, Q28, sustainability, SECS-P/01 Economia politica, C73, Population dynamics (general), Quaderni - Working Paper DSE, tragedy of commons, Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand), resource extraction, tragedy of commons; sustainability; differential games; resource extraction, Differential games (aspects of game theory)
L13, open-loop controls, Q20, Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.), ddc:330, differential games, Q28, sustainability, SECS-P/01 Economia politica, C73, Population dynamics (general), Quaderni - Working Paper DSE, tragedy of commons, Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand), resource extraction, tragedy of commons; sustainability; differential games; resource extraction, Differential games (aspects of game theory)
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