
arXiv: 1004.2239
The concept of informal mathematical proof considered in intuitionism is apparently vulnerable to a version of the liar paradox. However, a careful reevaluation of this concept reveals a subtle error whose correction blocks the contradiction. This leads to a general resolution of the classical semantic paradoxes. This paper is an expanded version of parts of my earlier paper "Constructive truth and circularity" [arXiv:0905.1681].
13 pages
Logic, formal mathematical proof, Mathematics - History and Overview, History and Overview (math.HO), Liar paradox, Mathematics - Logic, internal model principle, Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations, Intuitionistic mathematics, Intuitionism, Philosophy of mathematics, FOS: Mathematics, intuitionism, semantic paradoxes, Semantic paradoxes, liar paradox, Logic (math.LO)
Logic, formal mathematical proof, Mathematics - History and Overview, History and Overview (math.HO), Liar paradox, Mathematics - Logic, internal model principle, Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations, Intuitionistic mathematics, Intuitionism, Philosophy of mathematics, FOS: Mathematics, intuitionism, semantic paradoxes, Semantic paradoxes, liar paradox, Logic (math.LO)
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