Stability and largeness of core for symmetric games

descriptionPublicationkeyboard_double_arrow_right Article 17 Feb 2000Publisher:Springer Science and Business Media LLCJournal:International Journal of Game Theory, volume 29, pages 11-22 (issn: 0020-7276, eissn: 1432-1270,

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Authors: Amit K. Biswas; G. Ravindran; T. Parthasarathy;

doi: 10.1007/s001820050002

Stability and largeness of core for symmetric games

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Abstract

Shapley showed the necessary and sufficient condition for the core to be the stable set. The main result of this paper is an alternative proof of this result.

Related Organizations

Indian Statistical Institute
India

Keywords

Cooperative games, specified vectors, Symmetric game, stable core, lower boundary, specified vectors, stable core, lower boundary, symmetric game

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