The Nazi holocaust of a quarter century ago seemed to have as many victims as survivors. Fortunately for the world of psychology, there was, among the latter, a young Viennese psychiatrist of Jewish parentage named Viktor Frankl. In the time that has elapsed since the end of Nazism the name of Frankl has risen to the forefront among those who are attempting to provide us with some guidelines for understanding human behavior. Frankl's work, unlike much of that of his predecessors, leaves open a door for dialogue between the behavioral sciences and theology. This means the opening of some avenues of communication between those whose daily work involves helping people to understand the meaning of their everday behav ior (the psychologist and psychiatrist) and those whose daily work involves helping people to see their everyday behavior in terms of its ultimate signifi cance (the pastor). This communication represents a significant break through in the relation between two major academic disciplines and, in the final analysis, between the practitioners of each discipline. The history of dialogue between the two has been plagued with periods of nondialogue. Practitioners in each area have, more often than not, been reluctant to engage in any significant communication. The zenith periods of Watsonian behaviorism and Adlerian individual psychology seemed to leave little open ground for those in religion to plant any seeds of dialogue. The ostensibly antireligious posture of Freudian psychoanalysis seemed to have served only to widen the gap. However, in the early 1950s, with the publication of Viktor Frankl's works, the climate appeared to be changing. For the first time in decades, in the theories of existential analysis, or more popularly logotherapy, religion ists envisioned an opportunity for meaningful interchange with those who shared with them the distinction of being part of what are traditionally termed the helping professions. Logotherapy did not violate any religious presuppositions. Unlike behaviorism, it did not assume a mechanistic posture on the subject of behavior and motivation. Unlike Adlerian psychology, it did not assume the basic drive in man to be one to power. Unlike the Freudian school, it did not consider religious experience and practice to be a type of neurotic aberration.