In this paper I want to make a start at defending the idea that the experience of God, or, as I shall say, the perception1 of God plays an epistemic role with respect to beliefs about God importantly analogous to that played by sense perception with respect to beliefs about the physical world. To be sure, what it takes for an important analogy depends on just what epistemic role sense perception does play, and that is a matter of considerable controversy. Nevertheless, it is admitted on (almost) all hands that sense perception does provide us with knowledge (justified belief) about perceived things, happenings, and situations in the physical environment of the perceiver, and that this perceptual knowledge is essential to our having any further knowledge about the physical world. My idea is that, likewise, one's perceptions of God can furnish one with knowledge (justified belief) about what God is doing vis-a-vis the person at that moment (sustaining her in being, filling her with love or peace, strengthening her, communicating a certain message, or just being present). Call beliefs of this sort M-beliefs ("M" for "manifestation"). And, likewise, this perceptual knowledge of God is essential to any other knowledge of God we may acquire. This paper constitutes only a small part of the elaboration and defence of this idea. One segment I will not get into concerns the way in which perceptual knowledge fits into the total picture, either with respect to our knowledge of the physical world or with respect to our knowledge of God. Hence I will not try to identify the other contributions to knowledge in either sphere, nor will I go into the ways in which perceptual knowledge supports, and/or is supported by, other sorts of knowledge. Instead, I will concentrate on defending a very modest claim concerning the epistemic status of our perception of God. Think of the matter in this way. With respect both to sense perception and the perception of God, the fact that X