In his The Scientist's Role in Society, Joseph Ben-David said that "the so-called sociology of knowledge" is a theory which asserts "that there are regular relationships between the perspectives and motives of social groups on the one hand and philosophical, legal and religious (or ideological) systems of thought on the other".1 Thus construed, the sociology of knowledge was, according to Ben-David, a false theory, forto take the strongest possible case "there is no relationship between class interests on the one hand and concepts and methods of philosophy on the other, even in the so-called ideological field, where such a connection appears highly plausible".2 A fortiori, there can be no valid sociology of scientific knowledge: "Social conditions are reflected in the substantive contents of philosophical discussion, but only rarely in the concepts and theories of the different philosophies. . . . What can, however, influence science is the conceptual and theoretical structure, not the contents."3 Ten years later, in a paper critically reflecting on the recent "strong programme" in the sociology of scientific knowledge, Ben-David's stance was unaltered: