The paper applies the technique of update semantics [see, e.g., \textit{J. van Benthem}, ``General dynamics'', Theor. Linguist. 17, No. 1-3, 159-201 (1991; Zbl 0743.03019)] to the Austinian semantics of \textit{J. Barwise} and \textit{J. Etchemendy} [The liar: an essay on truth and circularity (1987; Zbl 0678.03001)] in order to throw further light on the Liar Paradox. Essentially, for every sentence, \(A\), a binary relation on the set of situations, \([A]\), is defined, such that \(s[A]t\) may be thought of as stating that \(t\) is the situation obtained by updating \(s\) with the information that \(A\). The relation is shown to have some natural properties, though where self-referential propositions are concerned it need no longer be the case that if \(s[A]t\) then \(A\) holds in \(t\), because of a context-dependence. The approach allows for a treatment, somewhat different from Barwise and Etchemendy's, of paradoxes where there is multiple cross-reference. But as a solution of the liar, it would seem susceptible to the same basic objections as Barwise and Etchemendy's own account [see the reviewer, ``Another disguise of the same fundamental problems: Barwise and Etchemendy on the liar'', Austral. J. Philos. 71, 60-69 (1993)].