In an earlier work (Bacharach and Lawler, 1981), we proposed a dependence approach to the bargaining process. Building on some of the earlier ideas in power-dependence theory (Emerson, 1972), we outlined a general theory of bargaining power, the central idea of which is that the bargaining power of a party-whether an individual, organization, or nation-is based on the dependence of others on that party. For example, the power of the United States over Japan is determined by the dependence of Japan on the United States for valued benefits; similarly, the power ofJapan in its relationship with the U.S. is a function of the dependence of the U.S. on Japan for valued benefits. Within the dependence framework, the bargaining power of each party is determined by the OTHER'S dependence on them, not its own dependence on the other. Dependence varies according to: (1) the commitment to (Le., value or importance of) the benefits at stake in the relationship; and, (2) the availability of the benefits from other parties. The theory assumes that there is an existing two-way flow of benefit in the relationship (Le., an "exchange"), and the dimensions of dependence apply to such benefits. Thus, the dependence of Japan on the U.S. would be based on two conditions: how important the benefits provided by the United States are to Japan (Le. , the commitment" to the benefits in the terms of the theory); and (2) the availability of these bene­ fits from other nations. Soybean sales to Japan would increase the power of the U.S . to a degree that soybeans are of considerable importance to Japan and not readily available (in sufficient quantities, at least) from alternative nations. Beginning with these simple notions, we have made a series of modifica­ tions in the theory. First, we treat dependence (and, hence, bargaining power) as nonzero sum in character. That is, our framework allows for the possibility that both parties in a continuing relationship will increase their bargaining power, and rejects the assumption that an increase in one party's power necessarily decreases the other's power. Over time, the bargaining power of both parties may also change in the same direction (increase or de­ crease). Therefore, the total power in the relationship is not constant; it can vary. Second, our framework stresses the tactical aspects of the bargaining process. That is, our purpose is to develop a framework for understanding