
When we judge the probability of a statement r we try to take into account as much information as possible. But not all information that we have, or can obtain, is relevant to r, and it is only relevant information that is of any importance. Thus ‘relevance’ ought to be a central concept in the philosophy of science. However, the logical foundations of this concept have not been discussed very much. The purpose of this paper is to show that the traditional account is unsatisfactory and to suggest an alternative analysis of the relevance relation.
Foundations of Probability, Modal Logic, General logic, Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations, Axioms; other general questions in probability, Logic of Relevance, Modal logic (including the logic of norms)
Foundations of Probability, Modal Logic, General logic, Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations, Axioms; other general questions in probability, Logic of Relevance, Modal logic (including the logic of norms)
| selected citations These citations are derived from selected sources. This is an alternative to the "Influence" indicator, which also reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | 40 | |
| popularity This indicator reflects the "current" impact/attention (the "hype") of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network. | Top 10% | |
| influence This indicator reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | Top 1% | |
| impulse This indicator reflects the initial momentum of an article directly after its publication, based on the underlying citation network. | Average |
