ONE Of the standard objections to Hare's prescriptivist analysis of moral judgments is that this analysis is incompatible with the phenomenon of akrasia or "weakness of will." According to the prescriptivist analysis, so the familiar argument runs, it is impossible to assent to a moral judgment (or, at any rate, to assent "fully" to a moral judgment being used in its "central" sense) and yet fail to act in accordance with it. However, because we are all, at least occasionally, subject to the malady of akrasia, we all do, at least occasionally, assent to moral judgments and yet fail to act in accordance with them; hence, AUTHOR'S NOTE: This paper was read at the 1969 meeting of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association. Work on this paper was supported by a Johns Hopkins Faculty Research Grant, which I hereby gratefully acknowledge. 81