IN AN article entitled "Mr. Pap on Meaning Rules," 1 Mr. Grover Maxwell contends that the necessary character of analytic truths can be accounted for solely on the basis of linguistic rules or stipulations. The purpose of the present paper is to discuss this contention. I wish to avoid, as far as possible, consideration of "Platonism" (I agree, of course, with Maxwell that meanings or universals should not be thought of as shadowy particulars), and of the necessity of intuition in the determination of necessary truth. I should suppose, however, that some appeal to intuition is necessary in determining the truth-value of any statement, if direct understanding of the meaning of sentences is counted as a kind of intuition; after all, a statement cannot specify its own meaning. It should be remarked, moreover, that intuition is a notion relating not to the truth of statements, but at best to the recognition of such truth. Thus, even if 33