Moral realism and moral judgments
Copyright policy ) Frederik Kaufman;
Moral realism and moral judgments
For moral realists moral judgments will be a kind of factual judgment that involves the basically reliable apprehension of an objective moral reality. I argue that factual judgments display at least some degree of conceptual sensitivity to error, while moral judgments do not. Therefore moral judgments are not a kind of factual judgment.
- Ithaca College United States
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These citations are derived from selected sources.
This is an alternative to the "Influence" indicator, which also reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically).
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This indicator reflects the "current" impact/attention (the "hype") of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network.
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