Recently Richard Swinburne has argued that the well-known Free Will Defense can provide an explanation of God's permitting moral evil (i.e., evil intentionally brought about by human agents) only if there is also natural evil (i.e., evil not intentionally brought about by human agents).1 Ultimately his argument aims to show that there must be natural evil if we are to have the knowledge we need to have in order to bring about moral evil. Thus, if Swinburne's argument is sound, then, contrary to common opinion, if the Free Will Defense can meet objections to God's existence arising from moral evil, then that Defense can also meet such objections arising from natural evil. My aim in what follows is twofold. First, in Part I, I shall restate Swinburne's argument in succinct form, and show why it is ultimately unsuccessful. And secondly, in Part II, I shall sketch an alternative argument that purports to improve on Swinburne's argument.