This paper concerns the notion that we shall live again after our death and dissolution. Philosophers have argued that this is not logically possible because, however closely they may resemble us, no beings arising after our death and disolution could be identified with us. Arguments supporting this denial will be critically examined. First, however, I will here set forth an account of (pre-mortem) human beings that, though in my view the only correct one, seems to support and even to require the anti-resurrectionist st.ance I will oppose. This account is non-dualist, so that no lingering 'soul substance' is available to ground claims identifying post-mortem pretenders with human beings who have died. It seems, then, that if correct a nondualist account of human beings insures the logical incoherence of any thought or hope or doctrine we may have of a life after death - or, at any rate, of a life after death and dissolution. The non-dualist account to be presented here is not that of dualism's traditional oppenent, materialism. The view embraced is both non-dualist and non-materialist. But how can both dualism and materialism be avoided? Must one not hold a human being to be either a body and a soul or a body without a soul? To see how both these traditional accounts can be avoided, consider first a debate that mirrors the dualist-materialist controversy. Instead of the nature of human beings it concerns the nature of ordinary physical objects such as rubber balls, apples, bits of wax, and pieces of chalk: and the 'substance' whose presence is in question is material, not spiritual. The 'dualist' in this controversy holds that objects are comprised of two kinds of thing, sensible properties and the substances that underline those properties and insure an object's identity through all sensible change. Descartes' bit of wax whose substance maintains the bit's identity through its heat-induced change of properties is of course a dualist conception. The opposing 'materialist' denies that objects are comprised of two kinds of thing: instead they are composed only of sensible properties with no substances underlying them. William James, who takes this view in Pragmatism (Lecture Three), held that the notion of an underlying substance must be abandoned, that sensible properties, therefore, do not inhere in a substance,