In response, other philosophers and theologians have argued that the concept of a 'best possible world' is meaningless since for every possible world God can create, there exists another actualizable world with a higher degree of perfection. They conclude, accordingly, that since God cannot be faulted for not creating that which cannot exist, the fact that he fails to create the best possible world certainly cannot be said to count against his omnibenevolence.1 I have argued elsewhere that this line of reasoning is not convincing.2 But let us assume that I am wrong. What then can we say about an omnibenevolent God's creative obligations? I shall first argue that even if there exists no single possible world which is better than all the rest, there is still a meaningful, important sense in which it can be claimed that an omnibenevolent God is obligated to maximize the quality of life for those beings he chooses to create. I shall then defend this concept of omnibenevolence against Robert Adams' contention that an omnibenevolent God need only insure that the beings he creates lead lives which are on the whole worth living.