Does Neutral Stability Imply Lyapunov Stability?

descriptionPublicationkeyboard_double_arrow_right Article 01 Nov 1995 English Publisher:Elsevier BVJournal:Games and Economic Behavior, volume 11, pages 173-192 (issn: 0899-8256,

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Authors: Bomze, Immanuel M.; Weibull, Jörgen W.;

doi: 10.1006/game.1995.1048

Does Neutral Stability Imply Lyapunov Stability?

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Abstract

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Related Organizations

Stockholm School of Economics
Sweden
University of Vienna
Austria

Keywords

Noncooperative games, Problems related to evolution, evolutionarily stable strategy, Lyapunov stability, Lyapunov and other classical stabilities (Lagrange, Poisson, \(L^p, l^p\), etc.) in control theory, Differential games (aspects of game theory), evolutionary game theory, neutral stability, replicator dynamics

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