The mind–body problem is the problem of explaining how the happenings of our mental lives are related to physical states, events and processes. Proposed solutions to the problem vary by whether and how they endorse physicalism, the claim that mental states are ultimately “nothing over and above” physical states, and by how they understand the interactions between mental and physical states. Physicalist solutions to the mind–body problem have been dominant in the last century, with the variety of physicalism endorsed (reductive or nonreductive) depending upon both the outcome of philosophical arguments and methodological developments in the cognitive and neural sciences. After outlining the dominant contemporary approach to the mind–body problem, I examine the prospects for a solution in light of developments in the cognitive sciences, especially the scientific study of consciousness.This article is categorized under:Philosophy > ConsciousnessPhilosophy > MetaphysicsPhilosophy > Foundations of Cognitive Science