AbstractPhilosophical concerns about restoring landscapes often revolve around two, connected, issues. First is the idea that a restored landscape, even if it is a perfect replica, has lost some of its value. The claim might appeal to a break in the continuity of the landscape and that continuity is part of what is valuable. Alternatively, often in the case of natural landscapes, the appeal is that any human manipulation is inauthentic; here the analogy is sometimes made with the art world and the restoration is deemed a fake. The second problem highlighted in philosophical debates is that the greater the success of restoration projects, the more threatened natural landscapes become: any claim that something must be preserved in its pristine or historically layered state is undermined by the claim that it could be put back again.Initially I discuss two opposing potential responses to these claims: (1) that humans are part of nature and thus cannot be an alien dominating force outside of nature; and (2) that nature is itself a social construct. Neither of these positions is entirely satisfactory, but what they jointly reveal is the reality of our fluid and multifaceted relationship with the world. I then show that Elliot's claim of the additional value of pristine nature is actually not based on an inherent value, but is dependent on the human valuation of it. I propose an alternative that places the source of value in the thing itself and thus arrive at a positive role for restoration as the setting in train and guiding of positive relationships above and beyond their social or public amenity value to us. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.