
AbstractAlthough many studies point to the significant influence of collective bargaining (CB) institutions on earnings inequalities, evidence on how these institutions shape poverty rates across developed economies remains surprisingly scarce. This paper explicitly addresses the relationship between CB systems and working‐age poverty ratesbeforeandaftertaxes and transfers in 24 developed countries over the period 1990–2015. Our results show that countries with a more centralized CB system, a more extended bargaining coverage rate and/or a higher trade union density display significantly lower poverty rates. However, these results only hold in a post‐tax benefit scenario. Controlling for country and time fixed effects and a wide range of covariates, our estimates indeed suggest that the poverty‐reducing effect of CB institutions stems from the political strength of trade unions in promoting public social spending rather than from any direct effect on earnings inequalities. Sensitivity tests for endogeneity and overlapping samples support this conclusion.
Welfare and Poverty: Government Programs, Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Collective bargaining systems, Arbitration, and Effects, poverty rates, Poverty rates, Objectives, Structure, and Effects [Trade Unions], panel data, Single Variables: Models with Panel Data, Models with Panel Data [Single Equation Models; Single Variables], J51, J52, I32, advanced economies, Panel data, I38, Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs, ddc:330, Social security expenditures, collective bargaining systems, social security expenditures, Structure, Trade Unions: Objectives, and Mediation, Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation; Collective Bargaining [Dispute Resolution], Collective Bargaining, Economie, Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs [Welfare and Poverty], Advanced economies, C26, Single Equation Models: Single Variables: Instrumental Variables (IV) Estimation, Measurement and Analysis of Poverty, Single Equation Models, Single Variables: Instrumental Variables (IV) Estimation [Single Equation Models], C23
Welfare and Poverty: Government Programs, Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Collective bargaining systems, Arbitration, and Effects, poverty rates, Poverty rates, Objectives, Structure, and Effects [Trade Unions], panel data, Single Variables: Models with Panel Data, Models with Panel Data [Single Equation Models; Single Variables], J51, J52, I32, advanced economies, Panel data, I38, Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs, ddc:330, Social security expenditures, collective bargaining systems, social security expenditures, Structure, Trade Unions: Objectives, and Mediation, Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation; Collective Bargaining [Dispute Resolution], Collective Bargaining, Economie, Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs [Welfare and Poverty], Advanced economies, C26, Single Equation Models: Single Variables: Instrumental Variables (IV) Estimation, Measurement and Analysis of Poverty, Single Equation Models, Single Variables: Instrumental Variables (IV) Estimation [Single Equation Models], C23
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| popularity This indicator reflects the "current" impact/attention (the "hype") of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network. | Top 10% | |
| influence This indicator reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | Average | |
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