The analysis of network routing games typically assumes, right at the onset, precise and detailed information about the latency functions. Such information may, however, be unavailable or difficult to obtain. Moreover, one is often primarily interested in enforcing a desired target flow as the equilibrium by suitably influencing player behavior in the routing game. We ask whether one can achieve target flows as equilibria without knowing the underlying latency functions. Our main result gives a crisp positive answer to this question. We show that, under fairly general settings, one can efficiently compute edge tolls that induce a given target multicommodity flow in a nonatomic routing game using a polynomial number of queries to an oracle that takes candidate tolls as input and returns the resulting equilibrium flow. This result is obtained via a novel application of the ellipsoid method. Our algorithm extends easily to many other settings, such as (i) when certain edges cannot be tolled or there is an upper bound on the total toll paid by a user, and (ii) general nonatomic congestion games. We obtain tighter bounds on the query complexity for series-parallel networks, and single-commodity routing games with linear latency functions, and complement these with a query-complexity lower bound. We also obtain strong positive results for Stackelberg routing to achieve target equilibria in series-parallel graphs. Our results build upon various new techniques that we develop pertaining to the computation of, and connections between, different notions of approximate equilibrium; properties of multicommodity flows and tolls in series-parallel graphs; and sensitivity of equilibrium flow with respect to tolls. Our results demonstrate that one can indeed circumvent the potentially-onerous task of modeling latency functions, and yet obtain meaningful results for the underlying routing game.

36 pages, 3 figures