AbstractThis study used event‐related potential (ERP) measurements to investigate whether error processing in a social context is modulated by top‐down influence of deterministic thinking, i.e., subjective beliefs that events are pre‐determined by previously existing causes. To this end, half of our participants were confronted with statements denying the existence of free will, aimed to induce more deterministic thinking, whereas the other half was assigned to a control group that read neutral statements. Thereafter, all participants performed a choice‐reaction task for their own and for the benefit of a second participant. Error rates were comparable in both groups and benefit settings, while only control participants showed enhanced post‐error slowing (PES) in other‐ compared to self‐relevant trials. On the neural level, other‐relevant errors elicited diminished early error signals (reduced ΔERN amplitudes) in deterministic‐intervention participants compared to controls. In subsequent processing, ERPs of deterministic‐intervention participants did not differentiate between the benefit settings, while controls showed reduced ΔPe amplitudes for others compared to self‐relevant errors. Taken together, our findings suggest that being confronted with deterministic compared to control statements reduced subsequent processing differences between other‐ and self‐relevant error processing. This might be beneficial in social evaluation or intergroup situations because it could decrease self‐cenetred processing biases often observed in these situations.